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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______
____________
Nos. 07-4253/07-4543
_____________
OCEAN GROVE CAMP MEETING ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
Appellant
v.
J. FRANK VESPA-PAPALEO, in his official
capacity as Director of the New Jersey
Division on Civil Rights, Office of the
Attorney General of New Jersey
_______________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Civil No. 07-cv-03802)
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 21, 2008
Before: BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.
(Filed: July 15, 2009)

*

The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.

__________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church (“the
Association”) appeals the District Court’s dismissal of its case against J. Frank VespaPapeleo, Director of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (“DCR”). The Association
brought this suit, asserting that the DCR applied the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“LAD”) in a manner that violated the Association’s First Amendment
rights when the DCR accepted and investigated discrimination complaints against the
Association. The underlying discrimination complaints were filed against the Association
when it denied access to its Boardwalk Pavilion to two couples who wanted to perform
civil union ceremonies there.
The District Court dismissed this case based upon the abstention principles set
forth by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We conclude that
the District Court correctly applied the doctrine of Younger abstention in dismissing the
parties’ claims concerning the Boardwalk Pavilion. With regard to the Association’s
request for declaratory relief to clarify its rights to use the rest of its property, we will
remand to the District Court to determine whether relief is proper.1

1

The District Court focused solely on the Boardwalk Pavilion in determining
whether to abstain under Younger. Similarly, the DCR proceedings at issue in this case
concern the complaints of two couples who sought to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for civil
2

I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts.
The Association is a Christian ministry formed in 1869 for the purpose of creating
a permanent Christian camp meeting community on the New Jersey shore. It owns all of
the land in the seaside community of Ocean Grove, New Jersey. At the center of this case
is a Boardwalk Pavilion located on Ocean Grove’s boardwalk, which is used for a variety
of events, including worship services, bible school programs, gospel music programs, and
a summer band concert series. When not hosting an event, the Boardwalk Pavilion is

union ceremonies. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Assoc., N.J. Div. on
Civ. Rights, No. PN34XB-03008, at 2-3 (Dec. 29, 2008) (“[T]he only facility at issue in
this investigation is the Boardwalk Pavilion.”); Moore v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Assoc., N.J. Div. on Civ. Rights, No. PN34XB-03012 (Dec. 29, 2008). The Association
repeatedly emphasizes, however, that its request for declaratory relief concerns its rights
with regard to all of its property, not just the Boardwalk Pavilion. The Association’s
complaint is consistent with this assertion. See Joint Appendix (J.A.) 34 (Complaint at
10) (detailing a request to use the Thornely Chapel for a civil union ceremony); J.A. 3537 (Complaint at 11-13) (asserting cause of actions regarding the use of the Association’s
“facilities”); J.A. 38 (Complaint at 14) (requesting a declaration “insuring that [the
Association’s] buildings, facilities and property under its control are used for purposes
consistent with its sincerely held religious beliefs”).
We note that the Association’s concerns regarding the Thornely Chapel seem
unwarranted because it is settled that churches, seminaries and other religious facilities
are not subject to the LAD. See, e.g., Wazeerud-Din v. Goodwill Home & Missions, Inc.,
737 A.2d 683, 687 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“[T]he Legislature clearly did not
intend to subject such facilities and activities [churches, seminaries and religious
programs] to the LAD.”). Because the record before us is only clear with respect to the
Boardwalk Pavilion, however, we will remand the Association’s claims regarding the rest
of its property to the District Court.
3

open to the public. Although the parties dispute the extent to which the Boardwalk
Pavilion had been rented for secular purposes prior to the present dispute, the Boardwalk
Pavilion has been available for rental by the public for wedding ceremonies.
In March 2007, Harriet Bernstein and Luisa Paster, residents of Ocean Grove,
applied to rent the Boardwalk Pavilion for their civil union ceremony. The Association
denied the application, stating that the requested use was inconsistent with the
Association’s religious beliefs. Bernstein and Paster filed a complaint with the DCR,
alleging that the Association illegally discriminated against them. Shortly thereafter,
another Ocean Grove couple, Janice Moore and Emily Sonnessa, who had also requested
to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for a civil union ceremony, filed a similar complaint with
the DCR.2
On August 13, 2007, the Association filed the present action in the District Court,
asserting that the DCR “[b]y accepting and investigating discrimination complaints
against [the Association], specifically discrimination on the basis of civil union status
based on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination,” has applied New Jersey law in
violation of the Association’s First Amendment rights of free speech, freedom of
expressive association, and free exercise of religion. The Association sought injunctive
and declaratory relief.

2

While this appeal was pending, the DCR issued a Finding of Probable Cause to
credit the allegations of Bernstein and Paster, and No Probable Cause as to the allegations
of Janice Moore and Emily Sonnessa.
4

The Association filed for a preliminary injunction on August 25, 2007, seeking to
enjoin the DCR from continuing its investigation arising out of the two discrimination
complaints. Two days later, the DCR filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of Younger
abstention. The District Court denied the Association’s motion for injunctive relief on
October 4, 2007, holding that because there were substantial issues of material fact as to
whether the Boardwalk Pavilion was a place of worship or a place of public
accommodation, the Association had not made a strong showing of likelihood of success
on the merits. The Association decided not to pursue its appeal of this denial.
Then, on November 5, 2007, the District Court granted DCR’s motion to dismiss
based on Younger. The District Court relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986). See
J.A. 18 (concluding that Ohio Civil Rights Commission was “directly on point with the
present situation” ). The Association filed a timely appeal of this dismissal.
II.
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because this is an appeal
from a final order dismissing the case.
This Court “exercises plenary review over the legal determination of whether the
requirements for abstention have been met.” Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of
Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). Once this Court determines that the
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requirements for abstention have been met, it “review[s] a district court’s decision to
abstain under Younger abstention principles for abuse of discretion.” Gwynedd
Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992).
III.
The Younger abstention doctrine reflects “a strong federal policy against federalcourt interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S.
423, 431 (1982). Since its inception, the doctrine has been extended to include “state
administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated . . . .” Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627; see also O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d
785, 789 (3d Cir. 1994).
Younger abstention is appropriate when (1) there is a pending state proceeding that
is judicial in nature, (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) there
is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding for the plaintiff to raise its
constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432. When all
three of these factors are met, abstention is proper unless “(1) the state proceedings are
being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other
extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly
unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding will present a
significant immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted.”

6

Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
The Association contends that Younger abstention does not apply here because:
(1) there was no pending state proceeding that was judicial in nature at the time the
federal suit was filed; (2) the Association’s claims do not implicate important state
interests because the Association did not challenge state law directly, but only the
allegedly unlawful conduct of government officials; (3) state proceedings do not afford
the Association an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims because its
federal claims involve broader issues than those involved in the state administrative
proceeding; (4) the “bad faith” and the “extraordinary circumstances” exceptions apply;
and (5) the District Court cannot apply Younger after electing to rule on the preliminary
injunction motion. After addressing each of these contentions below, we conclude that
the District Court correctly applied the doctrine of Younger abstention in dismissing the
parties’ claims regarding the Boardwalk Pavilion.3
A.
The Association argues that the first requirement of Younger is not met because
the early stages of the DCR proceedings are investigatory, not adjudicative, and therefore
do not amount to proceedings that are judicial in nature. The Association notes that the
administrative process at issue in this case is divided into two stages: an investigatory

3

As discussed supra note 1, we will remand the Association’s claims concerning
the rest of its property to the District Court for further review.
7

period after which the DCR makes a probable cause finding; and an adjudicatory period
during which a hearing is conducted before an Administrative Law Judge at the New
Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Association contends that the
administrative process is not “judicial in nature” under Younger until a probable cause
finding is made and the case is transferred to the OAL. Here, conversely, the Association
notes that at the time the federal suit was filed, the DCR had not even begun its
investigation. The Association thus attempts to distinguish this case from Ohio Civil
Rights Commission, in which the agency had made a finding of probable cause prior to
the filing of the federal court action. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 624.
Because we conclude that the DCR proceedings are judicial in nature from the point that
a complaint is filed, we reject the Association’s argument under Younger’s first
requirement.
The entire process at the DCR is adjudicatory in nature. The agency action is
initiated by the filing of a verified complaint with the DCR. N.J. Admin. Code § 13:42.6. The DCR then promptly serves a copy of the complaint on all respondents. § 13:42.8. A respondent must file an answer within 20 days after service, § 13:4-3.2; and, in the
complaint, the respondent must state the nature of its defenses to each claim asserted, and
must admit or deny each allegation in the complaint, § 13:4-3.2(a). After the receipt of a
verified complaint, the DCR undertakes a prompt investigation to determine if probable
cause exists to credit the allegations in the complaint. §§ 13:4-4.1(b) & 13:4-10.2(a).
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During the investigation, the DCR may, inter alia: serve interrogatories, § 13:4-4.3; issue
subpoenas, § 13:4-4.4; take depositions, § 13:4-4.5; and hold fact-finding conferences, §
13:4-4. To the extent possible, the DCR also tries to resolve the matter through
conciliation. See § 13:4-11.1(b).
After the investigation, if the DCR determines that probable cause exists to credit
the allegations in the complaint, the DCR orders a hearing and transfers the matter to the
OAL, which conducts the hearing. § 13:4-11.1(b) & (f). After this hearing, the Director
of the DCR issues findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a corresponding order.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-17. The parties are entitled to judicial review, and can appeal
directly to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court. § 10:5-21. Motion practice is
also permitted throughout the process, and is governed by the New Jersey Court Rules
prior to transmittal of the matter to the OAL, and is thereafter governed by New Jersey’s
Administrative Code. N.J. Admin. Code § 13:4-7.1.
Considering this elaborate statutory scheme for addressing civil rights complaints,
we must agree with the District Court that “[t]here simply can be no question” that the
DCR proceeding as a whole is judicial in nature. J.A. 22. The Supreme Court has
recognized that Younger abstention applies to proceedings conducted by civil rights
agencies, Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 627, and that administrative
proceedings can be judicial in nature from the moment a complaint is filed, Middlesex
County Ethics Committee, 457 U.S. at 433. The DCR proceeding in this case is very
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similar to the proceedings in Ohio Civil Rights Commission and in Middlesex County
Ethics Committee, and is judicial in nature from its inception. Notably, when a complaint
is filed with the DCR, the agency launches a “prompt” investigation that is akin to the
discovery period in federal court. And if, at the end of the investigation, the DCR finds
probable cause, a trial-like hearing is held. We conclude that this entire process is
judicial in nature and prong one of Younger is met.4
B.
Next, the Association contends that its claims do not implicate important state
interests because the Association did not challenge the LAD directly, but only the
allegedly unlawful conduct of government officials in enforcing the LAD. We disagree.

4

The Association also emphasizes that it is not appealing the denial of an
injunction but only the denial of declaratory relief; it thus contends that its claims do not
implicate Younger abstention or its underlying policy. Ocean Grove Br. 31-32
(contending that it is only requesting “a declaration of its constitutional rights . . . not []
an interpretation of state law,” and thus that the federal proceeding does not interfere with
the DCR proceedings). Notably, in the companion case to Younger, the Supreme Court
held that “the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should be judged by
essentially the same standards. In both situations deeply rooted and long-settled
principles of equity have narrowly restricted the scope for federal intervention, and
ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and
disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was
designed to avoid.” Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971). Here, the Association’s
complaint arose out of the DCR’s investigation into whether the Association’s refusal to
permit couples to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for civil unions violates the LAD. The
Association’s argument that its federal claims are separate from the DCR proceedings is
therefore mistaken -- whether the relief sought is injunctive or declaratory, Younger
abstention and its underlying policies are implicated in this case because declaratory relief
would “result in a clearly improper interference with the state proceedings.” Id.
10

The Supreme Court expressly held that there is “no doubt” that the elimination of
prohibited discrimination “is a sufficiently important state interest” to satisfy the
requirements of Younger. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 628. Moreover, when
evaluating Younger’s second prong, this Court must look to “the importance of the
generic proceedings to the state,” not to the specific concern of the particular proceeding.
New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989)
(noting that in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, “we looked not to Ohio’s specific concern
with Dayton Christian Schools’ firing of Linda Hoskinson, but to its more general interest
in preventing employers from engaging in sex discrimination”).
The state interest in this case is the same as the state interest considered by the
Supreme Court in Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and the Association’s contention that
its federal claims do not implicate the policy interests underlying the LAD is incorrect.
The federal complaint arose out of the DCR’s investigation into whether the
Association’s refusal to permit couples to use the Boardwalk Pavilion for civil unions
violates the LAD. Clearly, therefore, New Jersey’s interest in eliminating unlawful
discrimination is at the center of this dispute. Creative arguments in a brief cannot
undermine this commonsense application of the law. We therefore agree with the District
Court’s conclusion that the second prong of Younger is met.5

5

The Association also relies on our opinion in Gwynedd Properties, Inc. to argue
that Younger does not apply, asserting that the federal claims here are much broader than
the state claims because the former concern the Association’s use of all of its property,
11

C.
Next, the Association asserts that the third prong of Younger is not met because
the DCR proceedings do not afford the Association an adequate opportunity to raise its
constitutional claims. Although the Association appears to concede that it is generally
able to raise constitutional challenges at the DCR proceeding, it argues that its federal
claims are broader than the issues pending at the DCR, and therefore that it is unable to
raise all of its constitutional claims at the DCR. Specifically, the Association emphasizes
that in federal court it seeks declaratory relief with regard to all of its property, but the
DCR proceedings only concern the Boardwalk Pavilion.
To satisfy the third prong of Younger, it is sufficient “that constitutional claims
may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding.” Ohio Civil
Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 629. This requirement is typically met for claims pending at
the DCR because “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the director [of the DCR]
may take an appeal therefrom to the Superior Court, Appellate Division as an appeal from
a State administrative agency.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-21. With regard to the

while the latter only concern the Boardwalk Pavilion. Ocean Grove Br. 44-43 (quoting
Gwynedd Properties, Inc., 970 F.2d at 1201 (“The federal action relate[d] to the
[government officials’] conduct regarding the entire property, while the state proceedings
relate[d] to [only a portion of] the . . . parcel.”)). As discussed supra note 1, we will
remand the Association’s claims concerning the rest of its property to the District Court
for further review; therefore, this appeal only concerns the Association’s rights with
regard to the Boardwalk Pavilion. Because, unlike in Gwynedd Properties, the federal
proceedings here are certainly related to and would interfere with the state proceedings,
Younger abstention is appropriate. Cf. Gwynedd Properties, Inc., 970 F.2d at 1201.
12

adjudication of the Association’s rights concerning the Boardwalk Pavilion, therefore, the
third prong of Younger is clearly met. With regard to the rest of the Association’s
property, this point will be considered by the District Court on remand. See supra note 1.
D.
The Association also contends that the District Court erroneously abstained under
Younger because the “bad faith” and the “extraordinary circumstances” exceptions apply.
Specifically, the Association claims that: (1) the DCR acted in bad faith by endeavoring
to apply the LAD against the Association because DCR’s actions show disregard for
federal and state laws exempting religious organizations from certain discrimination
claims; and (2) extraordinary circumstances exist because the Association is subject to
multiple administrative enforcement actions that have chilled its exercise of constitutional
rights. We find these arguments to be without merit.
First, the DCR’s exercise of its statutory mandate to investigate discrimination
complaints cannot be construed as “bad faith,” and the Association has not demonstrated
that the DCR has conducted itself in a manner that shows any disrespect or disregard for
federal or state laws. Similarly, the Association did not establish the existence of
“extraordinary circumstances.” This exception does not apply any time there is a chilling
effect on the claimant’s exercise of constitutional rights. Younger, 401 U.S. at 51 (“[T]he
existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never
been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action.”). Also,
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the Association’s reliance on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), is inappropriate
because Wooley involved the threat of repeated arrests and prosecutions of individual
claimants, which impeded the claimants’ “ability to perform the ordinary tasks of daily
life. . . .” Id. at 712. This civil case is distinguishable, and does not warrant the
application of the “extraordinary circumstances” exception.
E.
Finally, the Association contends that the District Court cannot apply Younger
after electing to rule on the Association’s preliminary injunction motion. We disagree.
The District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction motion in this case was not a
proceeding of substance on the merits. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at 622
(holding that the District Court should have abstained under Younger where the District
Court initially refused to issue an injunction, finding that the First Amendment arguments
were not ripe and, in the alternative, that the First Amendment was not violated). We
therefore conclude that the District Court properly abstained under Younger and
dismissed the case.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part, and
remand in part for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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